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VisualMED Clinical Solutions Corporation
Good afternoon
My name is Sam
Huntley and I’m a Nursing Administrator at a small hospital in West
Texas where I serve in rotation as Administrator on Duty with
other senior nursing staff. Prior to joining the hospital where I am
currently located, I
worked for 17 years in Critical Care nursing at a nearby facility, where I was involved in assessing new technology
for the critical care environment. About a week ago, I was asked if
I could come up to Chicago to present data drawn from the hospital’s
experience with its EHR and decision support system, acquired from
VisualMED Clinical Solutions Corp back in 2004.
When I looked up
the brochure for the meeting over the internet, I saw that the
material to be covered in this session was originally centered
around the EHR experience of an unnamed Phoenix hospital, who, I
assume were selected as an example of an organization which
implemented a clinical information system as part of a process to
foster best practice and achieve fully electronic patient care
documentation. They sounded like the type of organization
well-positioned to analyze the impact of an EHR on clinical outcomes
and other indicators. They certainly sounded like the type of
organization that had 100% staff buy-in with respect to the
implemented EHR, with widespread support for the development and
evolution of the system into which they had invested time,
resources, and money.
There’s nothing at
all I can tell you about that Phoenix hospital. But what I’m going
to tell you about, is a small hospital in the real world, a hospital
that doesn’t run 90% occupancy, that didn’t have a master plan,
whose administration never committed to implement paper-free
documentation, and which has undergone major shifts in physician and
investor support in the three years of its existence. The hospital
I’m going to tell you about is a about as far away from a model EHR
site as you can get. From a certain perspective however, these
conditions may make the story a more interesting one.

Built in 2002
and 2003, the hospital opened its doors in January of 2004 as a
for-profit institution with about 30% physician ownership.
Currently, the hospital runs 40 inpatient beds, and maintains a
census of between 60 and 75% full. There are 6 operating rooms, 2
endoscopy suites, and a cardiac catheterization lab.
About 200
physicians maintain privileges at the hospital, with about 120 core
physician staff covering a wide variety of specialties.
The hospital
informatics “backend” is handled by Meditech components for ADT,
laboratory, radiology, pharmacy, and pathology. A Medquist dictation
system is available, as is a PACS and advanced medical imaging
systems. A conscious effort was made by the founding administrative
staff to find a clinical system front end through which all staff
would access healthcare informatics information, rather than using
Meditech for this purpose. This was because the senior
administrators, including the CEO at the time, came from clinical
backgrounds, came from Meditech backgrounds themselves, and were
looking for something that addressed clinical issues from a clinical
perspective. The VisualMED Clinical System was selected for that
purpose.
The clinical
information system with its CPOE, decision support, and EHR
components was installed in the Spring of 2004, went live in June of
that year, and has been in operation continuously since, for
clinical care documentation of all inpatient activities, endoscopy,
cardiac catheterization, pre-op, post-op, and E.R. The system
communicates with the appropriate backend Meditech systems,
including the pharmacy, and is able to integrate laboratory results
reporting, allergies, and findings documented in the EHR with
decision support.
So, how can an EHR
have a measurable impact on the quality of care?
Should we expect a decreased length of stay for defined DRG’s?
Should we expect a decrease in the number of adverse drug events?
Should
we expect decreased morbidity and mortality related to those avoided
ADE’s?
The literature
responds to all of these with a “YES.” I believe a thorough
statistical analysis of all aspects of care at the hospital
would demonstrate them as well. But I don’t have any of those
numbers to share with you this afternoon. I would instead like to go
through some smaller-scale scenarios that nevertheless document the
measurable impact that an EHR really has on quality of care.
These positive
impacts are felt where the EHR helps the hospital to meet regulatory
requirements, where it helps the hospital to meet internal
objectives, and where it supports best practice.
The JCAHO “Do not
use” list was developed in 2003 and 2004 and ratified at the
November 2004 National Summit on Medical Abbreviations. As shown in
this slide, the list contains a number of Latin-derived and other
entries that came to the attention of the Joint Commission following
their repeated implication in medical prescription error in audits
carried on in 2001 and 2002. Though designated for use in
paper-based documentation or in electronic free-text documentation,
the hospital requested the implementation of the “rationalized”
nomenclature during a JCAHO site visit that took place 2 weeks after
the clinical information system was implemented. The requested
changes were made to the EHR e-prescription content during the
afternoon of the first day of the JCAHO site visit. By the time the
inspector returned the following morning to complete her evaluation,
the “Do not use” list had been implemented in its entirety,
including several of the “optional” items on the list. As a result,
the hospital achieved 100% compliance in this important area in
2004, reducing iatrogenic risk clearly documented in the JCAHO
reports of the day. Of note, the JCAHO website today reports that
compliance with the requirements of the “Do not use” list reached
78% of JCAHO-affiliated sites only in 2006, the most recent year for
which data is available.
Use of the EHR
allows the hospital to evaluate itself according to the core
competencies are established from time to time by JCAHO and other
regulatory organizations.
A recent core
measure assessment involves the determination by a site that all
patients treated for heart failure as an inpatient be discharged
with a prescription for either an ACE inhibitor or an ARB unless
specified contraindications to such medications are noted in the
chart. Such contraindications might include a history of intractable
cough due to the medication, high serum potassium, or a moderate
degree of renal failure.
The graph in this
slide shows the percentage of all patients with an admitting
diagnosis of heart failure, as specified by ICD9 code, who at
discharge were given a prescription for a drug in the class of
either ace inhibitors or ARB. The graph covers a 3 year period,
beginning at the time of the implementation of the clinical
information system. In the first year, about 55% of patients with
the index diagnosis received the target medication, in the second
year, about 64% of patients, and in the third year, which ended just
this past July, about 85%. The total number of patients over this
period was just 75, so it is very possible that true statistical
significance is not attained. There is nevertheless a very real
trend and if we look more closely at the data, the results get even
better.
This slide shows
the same data as is displayed in the preceding slide. However, here
we have taken a look at those patients who had the index diagnosis
of heart failure, but who did not receive either of the target
medications, AND who were found to have a high serum potassium. A
high serum potassium is one of the relative contraindications to
prescription of the target medication according to the JCAHO fact
sheet which accompanies the published core measure requirement.
Patients who had the index diagnosis, were given no target
medication and who had a high potassium are shown in orange in the
bar graph. The y axis is again expressed in terms of percent. Each
blue and orange bar therefore represents the sum of those patients
treated correctly plus those not treated, but also, correctly. In
other words, the physician made a correct intervention by not
treating a given patient if that patient had a contraindication to
treatment. Looking at the numbers, in year 1, 65% of index patients
were treated correctly; in year 2, 70%, and in year 3, nearly 90%.
In fact, it’s possible that the clinical care was even better, as
this analysis doesn’t take into account those patients who might
have had intractable cough due to the administration of one of the
target medications, nor those patients with more than moderate renal
failure. Given the time available to put together this presentation,
the analysis was not carried further. Be that as it may, the
clinical staff maintained a very respectable record on their own,
and that record improved with time.
Individual
hospitals may have internal requirements independent of those
mandated by regulatory organizations. A requirement for
cost-containment is one of these, and one which is well suited to
implementation through an EHR system.
Our hospital recently took on a new Pharmacy Director who reviewed drug
usage history and developed a plan to rationalize drug use at the
site. Prior to the start of this process, any staff physician could
prescribe any medication, and that medication would be obtained from
an off-site pharmacy even if a generic equivalent existed at the
hospital. As you can imagine, the pharmacy budget required to
maintain such a habit was not sustainable.
One of the
medications targeted by the pharmacist was pantoprazole, used to
treat gastric hyperacidity. The very small pharmacy staff was not in
a position to seek out every physician following a pantoprazole
prescription, nor were they in a position to issue an ultimatum to
physicians, who, in El Paso, have a reputation of being somewhat
unruly. The solution seemed to be to build a drug warning algorithm
inside the EHR decision support module that would remind the
prescriber that an equivalent cost-efficient alternative was
available, and that it was in everyone’s interest to use it.
This slide shows a
portion of an EHR administrative decision support screen showing how
the message to the prescriber, specified by the pharmacist, would be
linked to the system recommendation for an alternative proton pump
inhibitor, omeprazole. The per tablet cost to the hospital for the
pantoprazole was $4.50 while the cost to the hospital for the
alternative omeprazole was just 60 cents.
Below the screen
sample, we see the data for the first few months of operation of
this drug warning, normalized to one full year. In the year ending
immediately prior to the initiation of the cost containment program,
expenditure in the pharmacy budget for pantoprazole came to $42,637.
Normalizing data to one year, based on data collected to date,
pantoprazole prescriptions are expected to fall by 41%, in view of
the fact that in a little more than 3 months, the algorithm as been
triggered 138 times, and in 57 instances the prescriber either
cancelled the pantoprazole prescription altogether, or accepted the
system-generated alternative, omeprazole. We can therefore
anticipate that the annual expenditure for pantoprazole will drop to
about $25,000 and though there will be an increase in expenditure
for omeprazole, that increase will amount to just $1,446. Taking
into account that the prescribers cancelled about 15% of their
pantoprazole prescriptions without substituting any alternative,
there is a net saving to the hospital of $16,165 in the first year.
In fact it is likely that savings will increase in subsequent years
as repeated exposure to the algorithm trigger causes more resistant
staff to change their prescribing habits. Review of the medical
literature shows that exposing prescribers to the actual cost of the
prescribed medication results in reduced prescribing costs over
time.
Essentially every
hospital has a requirement for the internal publication of a monthly
infection control report. How many hospitals have a requirement for
a monthly infection control report that is actually produced within
a day or two of the end of every period? A timely infection control
report can be used as a surveillance instrument, a much more
powerful tool than a simple reporting document.
The EHR is used at
the hospital as the basis of the monthly infection control
report. Infection control staff routinely document infection control
issues in each patient’s EHR. An informatics query is then applied
to each EHR at the end of each reporting period. Content of the
query is described by the list of field names typically accessed
from the EHR database table, shown in the center of the slide.
An excerpt from a
paragraph-format sample of a typical infection control report is
shown at the bottom of the slide. Though not shown in this
particular example, the EHR query takes patient room numbers into
account so that disease spread may be examined should clusters of
MRSA or other pathogens be noted in one or another hospital
location.

Introduction of
EHR is a real impetus to best practice, and I’d like to present some
evidence from our hospital in support of that claim. But
first, a bit of background: There are about 200 physicians on staff
at the hospital, many of whom work at multiple facilities nearby, in some cases seeing patients at as many as four other
hospitals in the course of a day. The actual physician presence
in-hospital varies widely, as does the closeness of any given
staffer to his or her case. Nurses take the real responsibility for
continuity of care for many patients, and are expected to
communicate with off-site doctors as they deem appropriate. In this
setting, therefore, the responsibility for prescription order entry
is divided among nursing and physician staff, although all orders
are initiated by the physician. The patient mix is as one might
expect in a community hospital, and some patients are quite sick.
There are a small number of respirator dependent patients, and some
receiving TPN at any given time. In a poly-pharmacy environment,
nephrotoxic medications are prescribed routinely. The questions are
these: (1), Does the hospital adhere to best practice in regards to
caring for its patients with kidney failure? and (2), Does an EHR
with integrated decision support make any material difference to
practice?
Developing the
answers to these two questions will occupy the rest of our session.
The type of analysis we will review is not unique to our hospital but applies to any order entry pathway for any medication
with narrow risk/benefit ratio and where optimal dosing can be
defined and predicted by combinations of laboratory, demographic,
and physical findings.
This slide depicts
the segment of a screen in our EHR system that the System
Administrator uses to set internal criteria for dose modifications
for any drug in the hospital formulary, all of which are prescribed
through the EHR decision support module. For the purposes of
discussion, I’ve highlighted the row labeled gentamicin at the very
bottom of the slide. The selection of that row causes the renal
failure dose modification method to be displayed for that drug in
the upper portion of the screen fragment. The method is displayed in
the lavender bands in the middle of the screen. The EHR formulary is
a mirror of the hospital formulary which takes into account clinical
business rules rather than inventory parameters and contains about
3000 listings, any one of which may be associated with a renal dose
modification rule. These rules are all empiric, are derived from the
medical literature, and were developed, tested, and validated by the
vendor’s pharmacy staff. They conform to methods routinely used for
renal dose modification at any clinical center. The rules make use
of the basic information any doctor should have at his or her
fingertips when prescribing nephrotoxic drugs: simply, the patient’s
age, sex, height, weight and a single laboratory test result, the
serum creatinine. This then is the architectural framework for the
decision support we are about to review.

This slide shows a
portion of the EHR decision support screen that is displayed to the
prescriber when he or she has ordered a nephrotoxic medication. The
system has already completed its real-time analysis of the order and
determined that a dose modification is necessary. The beige band at
the top of the image displays the text of the gentamicin
prescription as specified by the prescriber. The pink band below
that displays a modified version of the order that conforms to best
practice standards given the patient’s degree of renal failure. In
order to prescribe the correct dose of the medication, all the
prescriber needs to do is to press the button labeled “Save.” In
order to prescribe what is essentially the wrong dose, the user must
modify the dose amount highlighted in dark blue in the example or
modify the dose frequency using the screen control to the right, and
then press “Save.” The bottom line – the prescriber has to go out of
his or her way to prescribe the wrong dose, rather than press a
single key to prescribe the correct dose. And this is not a question
of local practice style, nor one of a choice among a set of safe,
equivalent doses. There is only one right answer. Every doctor knows
this. Nearly every doctor knows how to do the calculation, and if
not, can get the answer from the hospital pharmacist over the phone.
Doesn’t seem that there’s much room for improvement here by applying
an EHR decision support system.
The graph in this
slide shows the % adherence to best practice for the prescription of
nephrotoxic drugs, for all prescribers during the first three years
of use of the EHR decision support system. The trend is essentially
flat with about 40% adherence to best practice as defined by the EHR
system. In that system, the gold standard for best practice was
derived from the medical literature and then validated for every
individual drug contained in the system. Considering how easy it was
to confirm the best practice order presented by the EHR, and how
much work is involved in order write an incorrect order, the users
must have put in quite a bit of effort to get it wrong. Why would
they do this? The result is not at all what I would have expected,
taking into account their first class performance when it came to
prescribing ACE inhibitors in the setting of heart failure.
A few slides back
I made reference to the fact that physician practice varies widely
in terms of the numbers of verbal orders given per doctor. Over the
3 year period of this review, nearly 730,000 orders of all kinds
were generated by clinical staff, about 175,000 of which were orders
for medications. Of the 175,000 medication prescriptions, on
average, 46% were actually written by the doctor himself or herself.
Most of the orders actually written by the doctor were in ordersets,
where one or two keystrokes result in an entire set of prescriptions
being generated. On average, about 70% of all prescriptions written
by the physician himself or herself were generated through these
ordersets, which are built to each individual physicians’ personal
specifications.
This slide and the
slides which follow group the data so that we can examine the
performance of those doctors who write more than 50% of their
prescriptions themselves, versus those doctors who write less than
50% of their prescriptions themselves. All prescriptions not
actually written by the prescribing doctor are given to the nursing
staff as a verbal order, who then transcribe the orders into the
decision support module, generating a communication with the
pharmacy and an update of the Medication Administration Record
entry.
This slide
examines nursing performance in regards to best practice in the
setting of renal failure. Each lavender bar indicates % adherence to
best practice for each of the three years covered in the study. The
dark lavender bars represent the performance of nurses transcribing
orders for patients of doctors who write more than 50% of their own
orders, themselves. The light lavender bars represent the
performance of nurses transcribing orders for patients of doctors
who write less than 50% of their own orders themselves. Any
individual nurse could be represented in either or both bars for the
same year, as we are examining their behavior relative to the doctor
responsible for the patient they are caring for.
In the previous
slide we saw that across the board adherence to best practice was
flat at about 40% for all prescribers across three years. In this
graph we see that the adherence to best practice by nurses was worse
than the average, just reaching 15% in the third year. Remarkably,
therefore, the nurses went to the trouble of changing 85% of orders
recommended by the EHR system to the wrong orders. Of interest, but
not statistically significant, in each year of the study, we see
that nurses transcribing verbal orders for the group of doctors who
write more than 50% of their own orders, performed better than when
they transcribed orders for doctors who used the application
themselves as little as possible.

This slide was
constructed similarly to the slide we most recently reviewed, except
now we are looking at performance of the doctors themselves. The
light blue bars represent best practice performance in the setting
of renal failure by the group of physicians who write less than 50%
of their own orders themselves. The dark blue bars represent best
practice performance by the group of physicians who write more than
50% of their own orders themselves.
Performance by the
doctors writing less than 50% of their own orders is flat, at about
40% adherence to best practice over 3 years. Though better than the
nurses performance when given verbal orders by these same docs, the
effort required to have written the wrong order 60% of the time must
have been considerable, taking into account the extra time it would
have taken at the keyboard to accomplish that.
Performance
by the doctors writing more than 50% of their own orders is
remarkable. Not only did these docs start off with a better record
than that of their colleagues when the EHR system was first
implemented, but as time progressed they followed the best practice
recommendations to a greater and greater extent, hitting 85%
compliance during the third year. A very respectable record.
In this slide we
see the same best practice data for the high-performance doctors
compared to all of the other groups.
So what can we
conclude?
In the setting of
renal failure, doctors who write their own prescriptions for their
patients are better for their patients than doctors who have the
habit of delegating order entry responsibilities to nurses.
Doctors who depend
on nurses to transcribe more than 50% of their prescriptions are
responsible for twice as many incorrect prescriptions for
nephrotoxic drugs as their physician colleagues who write more than
50% of their patient prescriptions themselves.
Nurses who
transcribe prescriptions for nephrotoxic drugs avoid best-practice
solutions 80 to 90% of the time. In fact, nurses who transcribe
prescriptions for nephrotoxic drugs perform worse with respect to
best practice in renal failure than either prescribing-class of
physician.
What does an EHR
have to do with any of this? From one perspective, we might
conclude, “not much,” but we would be wrong. It’s true that overall
adherence to best performance in the setting of renal failure is
flat over three years, but at least it’s flat at 40%. That’s a lot
better than 0, and in the absence of an EHR-based decision support
system it would essentially be 0. Well, maybe not 0, as the
pharmacist would try to validate all orders in a timely fashion, but
in the absence of an EHR, would have to access one or another
informatics system manually to find relevant test results one at a
time, or find them in a paper chart, or would have to go to the care
unit to get patient’s height and weight which in the absence of an
electronic system either are not performed or available only by
locating the paper chart, itself perhaps accompanying the patient on
a two hour trip to radiology for an imaging examination.
What else does the
EHR bring to the table? It allows us to generate a quality control
audit based on the real practices of individual staff, in the course
of a single day, essentially a real-time response to a query
directed by hospital quality-assurance staff. In the case of renal
failure cases treated at our hospital, it shows us that the
relationship between nursing and physician staff is probably of the
one-way variety, and that an important effort needs to be made so
that nurses and doctors feel a part of the same care delivery team.
It is just not best practice for one group to simply delegate to the
other. We see perhaps the hint of movement in the right direction in
the case of the nurses transcribing verbal orders for the group of
physicians who write most of their orders themselves. One
explanation for nurses slightly improved adherence to best practice
when transcribing orders for that particular group of docs is that
they actually reported the decision support recommendation to some
of these docs, who then supported the EHR recommendation.
If prescribers
wrote for medications with no contraindications, no side effects,
and no dosing limitations, then anybody could write an order. But
medications don’t work that way, and the literature shows despite
the incredible advances in medical knowledge over the past two or
three decades, despite the academic credentials of professional
staff, simple oversights occur time after time after time in the
real world. These are the oversights that keep JCAHO in business,
the oversights that resulted in the development of the Leapfrog
Group Report, and the oversights that are at the origins of a
substantial fraction of medico-legal risk.
I’d like to stop
here, as many of you have as much or more experience than I do with
the implementation and use of EHR. I’ve presented a slice of data
which could not possibly have been collated by hand from a paper
record, nor for that matter, from any other system other than one
which supports comprehensive clinical care documentation at every
level of the clinical care process.
If there are any
questions, I’d be pleased to address them. Thank you.
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